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Raines v. Byrd: A Death Knell for the
Congressional Suit?
In Raines v. Byrd,1 the Supreme Court of the United States denied
standing to six members of Congress who challenged the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. In its first consideration of congressional
standing in nearly two decades, the Court held that a perceived
diminution in institutional voting strength did not create a sufficiently
particularized injury in fact to satisfy the Article III "case or controversy" requirement.'
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 9, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Line Item Veto
Act ("the Act")8 passed by the 104th Congress. In operation, the Act
gives the President the power to "cancel in whole" specific spending
provisions within certain types of appropriations bills4 without invoking
the traditional constitutional veto authority.' Once an item has been
canceled, the Act immediately prohibits the challenged expenditure or
tax benefit "from having legal force or effect.' Reinstatement of any
canceled provision can be accomplished only through bicameral passage
of an itemized "disapproval bill" within thirty days, to which the
President may again dissent through the use of the conventional veto
power.7 Congress can override this presidential veto only as prescribed
in Article .8 The Act overwhelmingly passed the Senate on March 27,

1. 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
2. Id. at 2322-23.
3. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. 1997).
4. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) allows the President, after signing a bill into law, to cancel (1) any
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3)
any limited tax benefit.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
6. 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4).
7. 2 U.S.C. § 691b(a).
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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1996 by a vote of 69 to 31. A day later, the House passed the identical
bill by a 232 to 177 margin. 10
The Act went into effect on January 1, 1997." The following day, six
individual Congressmen filed a complaint in the District Court for the
District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget.' 2 They alleged the
Act contravened "the text and purpose of ... the Presentment
Clause."" Defendants raised objections to the claim's justiciability,
alleging that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek relief, that the case was
not yet ripe for judicial resolution because the cancellation power had
not yet been exercised by the President, and that the "equitable
discretion" doctrine required dismissal in deference to substantial
separation of powers concerns. 4
The district court, relying on traditional standing requirements, held
that plaintiffs had shown at "an irreducible minimum" an injury (1) that
was personal to them, (2) that had actually been inflicted by defendants
or was certainly impending, and (3) that was redressable by judicial
decree.'" The court accepted plaintiffs' assertion that the Act impaired
their Article I voting power through its practical dilution of any
appropriations vote to mere approval of a "menu" of proposed expenditures 6 from which the President could pick and choose.' 7 "Under the

9. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2315.
10. Id.
11. Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 5, 110 Stat. 1200, 1212 (1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691692 (Supp. 1997)).

12. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25,27 (D.D.C. 1997). Plaintiffs were Senators Robert
C. Byrd, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Carl Levin, and Mark 0. Hatfield and Representatives
David E. Skaggs and Henry A. Waxman. Id. at 27 n.1.
13. 1d&at 27.
14. Id. at 30.
15. Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
16. Id. at 31. The District Court analogized the Line Item Veto Act to the Impound
Control Act of 1974 ("ICA") passed more than two decades earlier. Prior to enactment of
the ICA, Presidents had created an informal ability to "impound," or refuse to spend, any
legislatively approved appropriation that conflicted with their particular foreign policy
objectives or purported to advance an unconstitutional purpose. The ICA, unlike the Line
Item Veto Act, treated any future exercise of rescissionary power by the executive branch
merely as a counter-proposal, which would then require affirmative approval by Congress
to take effect. The court noted that Congress's failure or refusal to act under the ICA
would result in the rescission's expiration, a key distinction from the automatic
implementation scheme mandated by the Line Item Veto Act. Id. at 29-30.
17. Id. at 31.
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Act the dynamic of lawmaking is fundamentally altered," the court
explained.18
Rejecting defendants' argument that the claim lacked ripeness until
the President exercised the authority granted under the Act, 1' the court
proceeded to address the merits of plaintiffs' claims, finding (1) that
Congress had exceeded its traditional power to delegate;"0 (2) that the
authority it purported to grant the executive branch was a "basic"
legislative flmction; and (3) that the existence of legislative alternatives,
such as repeal or suspension of the Act's effect on particular legislation,
did not alter the President's new standing as "co-maker of the Nation's
laws."2 ' The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and held the
Act unconstitutional.22
Pursuant to the Act's provisions for a direct;' and expedited appeal, s' defendants sought review in the Supreme Court. After noting
proper jurisdiction, a six-member majority led by Chief Justice Rehnquist vacated the judgment of the district court, finding that appellees
lacked standing to initiate the suit.25
II.

THE LEGAL HISTORY OF STANDING JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's current test for general standing finds its genesis
in Allen v. Wright,2' a case brought by parents of children attending
public schools in districts undergoing desegregation. In Wright private
taxpayers sought injunctive relief against the Internal Revenue Service,
alleging that the agency was prolonging the desegregation process
through its continued recognition of discriminatory private schools as
"tax-exempt."27 In denying standing to plaintiffs, Justice O'Connor
stated that "the law of Article III standing is built on a single basic

18. Id.
19. See id. at 31-32.
20. Id. at 36. Congress may abdicate its legislative functions in certain limited
situations provided Congress articulates "intelligible principles" by which delegated
authority is to be exercised. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
21. Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 36-37.
22. Id. at 38.
23. 2 U.S.C. § 692(b).
24. 2 U.S.C. § 692(c) ("It shall be the duty of... the Supreme Court of the United
States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the
disposition of any [suit challenging the Act's unconstitutionality] brought under [Section
3(a) of the Act.]").
25. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2316, 2322-23.
26. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
27. Id. at 757.
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idea-the idea of separation of powers. "
The proper inquiry was
whether plaintiff had alleged (1) a "personal injury" that (2) was "fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct" and (3) was
"likely to be redressed" by a favorable judicial decision. 29 The Court
conceded that the language of this test was somewhat imprecise but
concluded that an "extensive body of case law" already existed to guide
lower courts through the appropriate analysis."
The Court clarified these basic principles in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife31 after environmental groups challenged a joint regulation
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior that revised the "consultation" requirement of the Endangered Species Act.12 Noting that the
groups' "desire to use and observe an animal species" was a cognizable
interest for standing purposes, the Court nevertheless denied standing
because plaintiffs could not show they would be "'directly' affected" by
the Secretary's enforcement of the regulation beyond their "special
interest" in the subject. 3 The Court explained that to satisfy the
Article III standing requirements, a plaintiff must first have suffered an
actual or imminent "injury in fact"3 4-an element the Court defined as
harm "affect[ingl the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."3"
Second, the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct
and may not be "'th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court.'" 3 Third, "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to
merely 'speculative,'" that the requested relief would resolve the
dispute.37
In contrast, when a member of a co-equal branch of government seeks
relief via the federal judiciary for alleged injuries suffered while serving
in an official capacity, federal courts are more vigilant in protecting the
stringent standing requirements mandated by Article III. Despite the
perfunctory statement that "there are no special standards for determin-

28.
29.

Id. at 752.
Id. at 751 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).

30. Id
31.

504 U.S. 555 (1992).

32. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994). Under the Act all federal
agencies were required to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to insure that any
action funded or carried out by the agency was not likely to "jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species" or adversely impact the habitat of these species. See
id. § 1536(aX2).
33. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
34. Id at 560.
35. Id. at 560 n.1.
36. Id. at 560 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976)).
37. Id. at 561.
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ing Congressional standing questions," 8 federal courts must in addition
to the three-part analysis consider the "prudential" concern of unnecessarily intruding on an inter-branch political dispute.39
The leading case on legislative standing arose in 1939 in Coleman v.
Miller.' In 1937 the Kansas Senate reconsidered ratification of the
proposed Child Labor Amendment,4 ' which had been submitted for
state approval thirteen years earlier pursuant to Article V of the United
States Constitution.4 2 The vote resulted in twenty ballots cast for
ratification and an equal number opposed. The Lieutenant Governor, as
presiding officer of the Senate, cast his deciding ballot in favor of
ratification."3 The twenty Senators who had voted against ratification" sought, and were denied, mandamus relief by the Supreme Court
of Kansas, which refused to compel the Secretary of the Senate to record
that the proposal had not received Senate approval." Upon review by
the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Hughes held that
petitioners had standing to seek judicial protection of their interest in
"maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.'4 The Court reasoned
that but for the ballot of the Lieutenant Governor, the Senators' votes
would have been sufficient to defeat ratification.47 As it was, the
affected Senators' votes were "virtually held for naught."'
Federal lawmakers have consistently attempted to rely on Coleman for
its holding that legislators have a vested interest in securing the
viability of their voting strength through the judicial process.49 In
Kennedy v. Sampson,' a United States Senator challenged the consti-

38. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

39.
25 GA.
40.
41.
42.

See Theodore Y. Blumoff, JudicialReview, ForeignAffairs and Judicial Standing,
L. REV. 227, 310-11 (1991).
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
43 Stat. 670 (1924).
See Harrington,307 U.S. at 435-36. In the thirteen years following its submission

to the states, twenty-six legislatures had rejected the proposed amendment; it was ratified

in only five. Id. at 436.
43. Id. at 436.
44. Plaintiffs also included one senator who had voted in favor of the amendment plus
three members of the state House of Representatives. Id.
45. Id. at 437.
46. Id. at 438.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Moore v. United States House
of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Byrd v. Raines, 956 F.
Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997).

50. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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tutionality of the presidential "pocket veto," alleging its use denied him
the full effect of his vote in favor of the bill in question. The D.C.
Circuit"' expanded Coleman to include members of Congress claiming
total vote nullification.52 Circuit Judge Tamm ruled that "[n]o more
essential interest could be asserted by a legislator" than vindication of
the effectiveness of his vote.'
The court also held that individual
legislators seeking this type of relief need not solicit approval from other
members of the affected voting block before initiating litigation because
the plaintiff need only be "'among the injured,' ... not ... the most
grievously or most directly injured.""4
The D.C. Circuit has subsequently refused to extend Coleman beyond
the limited situation of a complete nullification of a lawmaker's prior
vote on a specific piece of legislation as the result of a deviation from
constitutionally mandated legislative procedure. In Harrington v.
Bush,"5 the court cautioned that a separation of powers issue arises
whenever "a federal court decides a case brought by a United States
legislator."" Existence of a potential conflict is not dispositive in
standing analysis, but it is a concern of which the court must "properly
take notice."57
In Harringtonan individual Congressman brought suit claiming the
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") was actively misappropriating funds
for illegal purposes. The Representative sought a detailed accounting
record of CIA expenditures, arguing that any illegal activity would
directly "bear upon" his voting duty both in regards to future appropriations bills benefitting the agency and to his constitutional obligation to
initiate impeachment proceedings if necessary." The misuse of funds,
it was argued, also diluted the quality and effectiveness of his earlier
appropriations votes.5 9 The court quickly rejected the "bear upon"
arguments, finding they "clearly do[] not support a claim of standing in
this casese because plaintiff has not suffered a "'distinct and palpable

51. The D.C. Circuit has played a crucial role in the development of congressional

standing doctrine due to the court's unique jurisdiction and the subsequent reluctance of
the Supreme Court to review cases brought by legislators. See David G. Mangum,
Comment, Standing Versus Justiciability: Recent Developments in ParticipatorySuits
Brought by CongressionalPlaintiffs, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rzv. 371, 376 n.29 (1982).
52. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 436.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 435.
55. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 204-05 n.67.
Id.
Id. at 198-99 (citation omitted).
Id at 204.
Id. at 207.
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injury to himself."' 1 At best, plaintiff had alleged an institutional
injury shared equally by all members of Congress."2 Fully aware of the
underlying political motivation for the suit, the court concluded that "to
accept these grounds for standing would in effect allow.., an individual
legislator [to] have a roving commission to obtain judicial relief under
most circumstances' and would "open the Judiciary to an arguable
charge of providing 'government by injunction."'6
The Supreme Court of the United States eventually confronted the
issue of adjudicating inter-branch lawsuits in Goldwater v. Carter."
In a highly fractionalized per curiam opinion that is noted more for what
it did not say than for what it held," the Court dismissed a claim by
Congressmen seeking to enjoin the executive branch from unilaterally
terminating a defense treaty with the Republic of China."7 None of the
four opinions mentioned standing as a possible rationale for the
dismissal. In concluding that the dispute was not yet ripe for adjudication, Justice Powell warned that the judiciary should avoid interfering
with "issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and
Congress" until a political impasse is reached.s" Judicial review was
only proper after "each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority.69 Otherwise, "small groups or even individual
Members of Congress" would seek judicial intervention before the 7normal
0
political process has had the opportunity to resolve the conflict.
After Goldwater,lower courts interpreted Justice Powell's opinion as
authorizing greater discretionary power to confer or deny congressional
standing on a case-by-case basis. The D.C. Circuit in Riegle v. Federal
Open Market Committee7' adopted the use of a "doctrine of circumscribed equitable discretion"72 as a means to preclude standing even
when the congressional plaintiff otherwise satisfied constitutional

61.
62.

Id. at 208 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 601 (1975)).
Id. at 199-200 n.41.

63. Id. at 214.
64. Id. at 215 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222
(1974)).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

444 U.S. 996 (1979).
See Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 996.

Id.
656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The doctrine of "circumscribed equitable discretion" was created by the Supreme

Court as an efficient means to dismiss baseless claims for injunctive relief by plaintiffs

seeking shelter from imminent criminal proceedings. Mangum, supra note 52, at 384-85.
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standing requirements." If the plaintiff could still "obtain substantial
relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal, or
amendment of [the statute or regulation]," 4 courts should decline to
hear the dispute.75 The court reasoned that application of circumscribed equitable discretion as an additional tier of analysis would avoid
the separation of powers issue normally implicated by justiciability
concerns while assuring adjudication of legitimate claims that could only
be brought by a legislative plaintiff.7"
Circumscribed equitable discretion was tested only three years later
in Moore v. United States House of Representatives.7 7 Eighteen
Congressmen filed complaints challenging the constitutionality of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,"s alleging the bill
violated the Origination Clause.7 9 The district court dismissed the
complaint, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing for failure to allege a
sufficient injury in fact and, alternatively, that the issue was not proper
for the court to decide.s" The D.C. Circuit reversed on the standing
issue, noting that plaintiffs had alleged the specific and concrete injury
of deprivation of an opportunity to vote in a constitutionally prescribed
manner.8 1 However, "remedial discretion" mandated dismissal of
plaintiffs' claim as an exercise of "judicial self-restraint in particular
matters intruding upon a coordinate branch of government.' 2 The fact
that "private taxpayers have been found to have standing" on this issue
further compelled the court to dismiss the action because "the issue will
not go unresolved.' so

73. 656 F.2d at 881.
74. Id. According to the court in Riegle, the availability of a "collegial or In-house'
remedy," which traditionally would bar a suit by a member of Congress, acted to
differentiate between legislators and private plaintiffs. Id at 877-78. By requiring the
legislator to exhaust all alternative methods of relief before seeking judicial intervention,
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the standing analysis typically used in legislative suits is
fundamentally flawed. Id. at 879. "[The inappropriateness of the collegial remedy
principle as an aspect of congressional standing analysis has resulted in its inconsistent
application in the case law of this court." Id.
75. Id. at 881.
76. See id.
77. 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
78. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 states that I[all bills for raising Revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments as on other Bills."
80. 733 F.2d at 950.
81. Id. at 951.
82. Id. at 954.
83. Id at 956.
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After the decisions in Moore and Riegle, the D.C. Circuit further
disapproved of congressional suits relying on the premise that the
absence of a proper private plaintiff will allow the issue to escape
judicial resolution. Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee"4
provides a noteworthy example of how cognizant the courts have become
of these equitable concerns. In Melcher a Senator challenged the
constitutionality of the appointment process for members of the Federal
Reserve System's open market committee." The district court granted
judgment for the committee on the merits' but found that the lower
court should have exercised its discretion to decline to hear the case.87
Senator Melcher, relying on the suggestion in Riegle that the unavailability of a private plaintiff may affect legislative standing, argued that
the court should allow the suit when a private plaintiff would not be
able to mount a constitutional challenge." The court rejected this
contention, noting that the discussion in Riegle concerning private
plaintiffs was mere dicta."' Circuit Judge Starr explained that "[clourts
are not at liberty to embark upon a broad, undifferentiated mission of
[Tihat a constitutional violation
vindicating constitutional rights ....
in
itself,
permit the federal courts to
does
not,
go
unredressed
might
entertain the suit."9
Before the Supreme Court decision in Raines v. Byrd, congressional
standing principles, as developed by the D.C. Circuit, generally mirrored
the requirements established for private plaintiffs with two notable
contextual distinctions. First, the injury in fact needed to be sufficiently
concrete and could not include any claims of diminution of congressional
voting power or overall effectiveness. 91 The complaints had to show
either (1) the total nullification of a prior vote on a specific piece of
legislation or (2) a direct injury resulting from deviation from a
constitutionally mandated procedure.' In cases involving a departure
from mandatory procedure, the plaintiff might have constitutional
standing per se but still fail for "prudential" reasons if the reviewing
court determined that adjudication would unnecessarily encroach upon
an inter-branch political dispute.9

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 564-65.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974),
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 210 (1977).
Id. at 210.
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The second key distinction of congressional standing doctrine required
legislative plaintiffs to exhaust all collegial and institutional remedies
Unlike cases initiated by a private
before seeking judicial review."
litigant, courts needed to determine whether judicial intervention was
The "collegial
absolutely necessary in the particular instance.9
remedy" issue caused considerable confusion when the D.C. Circuit
originally held that the existence of a simultaneous political remedy
precluded standing because the plaintiff had failed to plead a sufficient
However, this same court later analyzed this
"injury in fact.""
shortcoming under the rubric of ripeness.'
III. RATIONALE OF RAINES V. BYRD: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In reaching its result, the Supreme Court held (1) that the Congressmen-appellees had not alleged a sufficiently "particularized" injury" to
establish a "personal stake" in the alleged dispute;- (2) that an
"especially rigorous" standing requirement is needed "when reaching the
merits of the dispute would force [a constitutional decision in an interbranch dispute]";"° (3) that an "institutional injurywl such as an
alleged diminution of voting power, alone is insufficient as a basis for
conferral of legislative standing;"° (4) that lawmakers alleging diminution of voting effectiveness must show total nullification of a previous
vote on a specific piece of legislation to establish standing;0 3 and (5)
that the federal judiciary should not intervene in suits involving
congressional plaintiffs if other collegial remedies, such as legislative
repeal or suspension, have not yet been exhausted."
The Court explained that a "'bedrock requirement'" of Article III
mandated the issue in dispute be a "'case' or 'controversy'" within the
Then, following the requirements of
meaning of the Constitution."
standing as defined in Allen v. Wright,"° the Court noted that the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 213.
Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565.
Harrington,553 F.2d at 214.
Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565.
Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 & n.1).
Id. (citing Ljan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
Id. at 2317-18.

101. Id. at 2318.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
See id. at 2318-20.
See id. at 2322.
Id. at 2317 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471).
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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plaintiff must allege "'personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant.'"10 7 Establishing this "'personal stake' in the alleged dispute"
necessitates that the complainant show "that the alleged injury suffered
is particularized as to him"'(* and "'affect[s] [him] in a personal and
The Court inferred that the recurring emphasis
individual way.'"'
placed on the injury's "personal" nature in prior case law drew a brightline distinction between completely private transgressions, which were
justiciable, and those injuries suffered in an official capacity, a type of
harm that independently could not support legislative standing.1 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued his explanation of the proper
standing inquiry by also noting that the injury must be "legally ...
cognizable"' and not "'too abstract'"" and that the dispute must
be "'capable of resolution through the judicial process.' ""' But above
all this, the Court mandated an "especially rigorous" standing analysis
when "reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide
whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal
Government was unconstitutional."" 4 For the Court to remain in its
"proper constitutional sphere,""" Article III standing analysis commanded
adherence to the "'single basic idea'" of separation of pow6
ers.1
Addressing plaintiffs' complaint, the Court characterized the underlying claim as one of an "institutional injury (the diminution of legislative
power), which necessarily damages all members of Congress and both
Houses of Congress equally."" 7 The Court found the alleged injury
was one "not claimed in any private capacity but solely because they are
members of Congress.""' The injury lacked concreteness because the
perceived harm runs with the member's seat, not the legislator
himself."' In essence, the Representative or Senator held the harm
in trust for his constituency." As a result, the Court concluded, if the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (emphasis removed)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1986)).
See id.
Id
Id (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752).
Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
Id at 2317-18.
Id. at 2318.
Id. (quoting Aen, 468 U.S. at 752).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

620

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

lawmaker
were "to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a
121
claim."
122
According to the majority, plaintiffs' reliance on Coleman v. Miller,
the only case in which standing was upheld for legislators claiming an
institutional injury, was misguided. 12 ' The Court distinguished the
present case from Coleman in that plaintiffs' votes on the Act received
their full constitutional effect and were not thereafter denied or
Voting power was not diminished "in a discriminatory
nullified."
The acknowlmanner" relative to any other member of Congress.
edgement in Coleman of a legislator's valid interest in safeguarding the
effectiveness of his vote was off-point when the alleged injury amounted
to an "abstract dilution of institutional legislative power" and not total
vote nullification. 2 '
The majority proceeded to detail a number of historical conflicts
between the executive and legislative branches, noting that none of the
given examples ever resulted in a legal challenge.' 27 The Court
concluded not only that plaintiffs' constitutional challenge was devoid of
any legal precedent but also that historical practice contradicted their
course of action." s Conceding that conferral of standing would not be
irrational in the instant case, the Chief Justice nevertheless explained
regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III
that "our
29
courts."'

In sum, because (1) plaintiffs failed to allege an injury to themselves
as individuals; (2) the harm alleged was "wholly abstract and widely
dispersed (contra Coleman)"; and (3) the "attempt to litigate this dispute
at this time and in this form is contrary to historical experience," the
Court dismissed the claim for failure to establish Article III standing."
Congress retained the power to repeal the Act entirely or
temporarily suspend its effect in relation to any particular piece of

121. Id.
122. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).

123. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
124. Id.at 2320.
125. Id. at 2320 n.7.
126. Id. at 2320-21.
127. See id. at 2321-22. The Court placed particular emphasis on the absence of a legal
challenge by several nineteenth century Presidents to the Tenure of Office Act. That act
required Senate approval of any attempted removal by the President of an officer whose
appointment originally required the consent of the Senate. The Supreme Court never did
hear a direct challenge to the Tenure of Office Act, but it did later invalidate a substantially similar procedure in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 117 S. Ct. at 2321.
128. 117 S. Ct. at 2321.
129. Id.at 2322.
130. Id.
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The Court refused to prematurely arbitrate what
legislation."'1
essentially was a political dispute between co-equal branches of the
federal government."2
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment but took issue with the
majority's reliance on a distinction between injuries suffered in a
personal versus official capacity."s Though some earlier cases precluded standing for legislators attempting to sue for official injuries,' 34 "our
standing doctrine [has not] recognized this as a distinction with a
dispositive effect.""s In addition, Justice Souter posited that it was at
least "fairly debatable" whether plaintiffs' alleged injury of a "continuing
deprivation of federal legislative power" was sufficiently concrete to give
Because that issue was in doubt,
the Congressmen standing."s
disposition of the complaint was more appropriate under general
separation of powers principles. 37 In deference to these basic tenets,
Justice Souter believed the Court should avoid immersion in "a political
tug-of-war,""s especially when a private plaintiff would certainly have
proper standing to litigate the matter.3 9
Justice Stevens, in a strong dissent, chastised the majority for its
failure to address plaintiffs' primary contention that the Act has a
continuous and deleterious effect on their daily functions as legislators."4 Not only did the Act deny the lawmakers the power to cast
4
votes on "truncated versions of the bills presented to the President,"' '
but it also completely eliminated the essential legislative ability to
negotiate and swap votes on individual provisions. 42 As a result,
plaintiffs' alleged injury was not a diminution of legislative effectiveness,
but rather was an outright denial of the right to vote on any bill that
may become law subsequent to a presidential cancellation."~ Given
this continuing threat, Justice Stevens believed the suit was ripe for

131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. See Braxton County Court v. West Virginia ex rel. Dillon, State Tax Conm'rs, 208
U.S. 192 (1908).
135. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
136. Id. at 2324.
137. Id
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2325.
140. Id. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2326.
142. Id. at 2327.
143. See id. at 2326.
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adjudication even though the cancellation authority had yet to be
exercised.'"
In dissent Justice Breyer argued that the Act's grant of jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court for an expedited appeal overcame any separation of
powers concerns that would normally arise so long as the dispute
constituted an Article III case or controversy.' 1 Finding that the
parties at issue were truly adverse'" and that a concrete injury
existed, resolution on the merits was proper. 4 7 Justice Breyer disFirst, as noted, the
agreed with the majority on three grounds."
jurisdictional issue was rendered moot by the Act's conferral of authority
to hear the claim. 4 9 Second, there was no constitutionally mandated
distinction between purely private injuries and infringements on official
duties.1 "e Finally, the majority erroneously relied on Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Coleman given its lack of precedential value. 5 '
Furthermore, the injury alleged by plaintiffs in the present case had a
drastic and widespread impact on the entire legislative process unlike
the mere proscription of the recording of a non-decisive amendment
ratification vote in Coleman.'52 Justice Breyer concluded that the
Court could not dismiss the action without overruling Coleman, a case
of binding precedent that required adjudication on the merits of the
present action."5

144. Id. at 2327. The District Court for the District of Columbia has since held that
groups adversely affected by the President's exercise of the cancellation power have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. City of New York v. Clinton, Nos.
CIV. 97-2393 TFH, CIV. 97-2463 TFH, 1998 WL 63070, at *7, *10 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1998).
On the merits of the claim, the district court ruled the Act unconstitutionally violated the
bicameral passage and presentment requirements of Article I and "disrupted" the balance
of powers between the three branches of government. Id. at *13. On February 27, 1998,
the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to review the constitutionality of the Act.
Clinton v. New York City, No. 97-1374, 1998 WL 81559, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1998).
145. 117 S. Ct. at 2327 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Justice Breyer noted that similar disputes had already been litigated within the
private context. Id. Cf, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997); Northeastern Fl.
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
147. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2327 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Id at 2328-29.
149. Id. at 2328.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2328-29.
153. Id. at 2329.
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IV. RAINES V. BYRD: REAL-LIFE IMPLICATIONS
The decision in Raines merits careful analysis for two key reasons.
Foremost, the opinion represents the Supreme Court's first consideration
of justiciability issues, particularly standing, within the context of
s
congressional suits since the 1979 decision in Goldwater v. Carter."
Second, Raines was a case of first impression for the Court on the issue
of whether an injury suffered solely in a Congressmember's official
legislative capacity was legally cognizable.
These factors, coupled with the obvious political implications the
decision entailed made Raines one of the most eagerly anticipated
Supreme Court rulings of the 1996-1997 Term. The voting alignment of
the Justices fell largely along expected lines. The majority opinion,
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was joined by Justices O'Connor,
In extremely broad
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.""5
language, the majority denied standing to the six legislators," each
of whom were members of the Democratic Party. Finding no sufficiently
concrete injury to warrant standing 157 and no factual basis upon which
to conclude that plaintiffs had established a personal stake in the
dispute,5 9 the Court dismissed the claim.
The Court's rationale continues the profound confusion surrounding
standing analysis following Allen v. Wright. 59 The Court blurs the
distinction between standing and other justiciability issues by continuing
to adhere to terms such as an "especially rigorous" standing inquiry
when constitutional principles are at issue. 16° Since the declaration in
Allen that standing rested on the "single basic idea" of separation of
powers, the Court has employed standing as a convenient method to
dismiss politically-oriented cases it does not want to decide on the
merits. This result is analytically curious because the Court has more
appropriate means by which it could dismiss the suit, namely categorizing the claim as not yet ripe for adjudication.
The Court's refusal to grant standing to legislators whose injury is
solely official in nature represents a profound step towards the eventual
proscription of the legislative suit. In the aftermath of Raines, it

154.

444 U.S. 996 (1979).

155. 117 S. Ct. at 2314. Justice Ginsburg also joined Justice Souter, concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 2323.
156. Id. at 2314.
157. See id. at 2318.
158. Id. at 2317-18.
159. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
160. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317.
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appears that only claims of an absolute denial of the constitutional right
to participate in the legislative process or a total vote nullification will
be recognized as sufficient injuries in fact to support congressional
standing. It is clear that lawmakers who allege that the legislative body
has acted in an unconstitutional manner no longer have standing to
initiate this type of claim.
The persuasiveness of the opinion is weakened by the majority's
failure to address plaintiffs' charge that the Act's operation would
require any canceled provision to be readopted by a two-thirds majority
(following the likely traditional veto of the "disapproval bill") rather than
the simple majority required for an "unseverable" bill prior to the
Act. 6 ' Although this contention implicates the constitutional merits
of the complaint, the allegation also rests squarely on the issue of
whether plaintiffs have pleaded an injury in fact. The Court offers that
the President would ultimately be held responsible through the normal
political process for overuse of the cancellation authority. This
speculative assertion avoids the central standing issue of whether a
constitutionally sufficient injury fairly traceable to the defendant's
conduct has been pleaded.
What impact the Supreme Court holding in Raines will ultimately
have on legislative plaintiffs remains to be seen. However, it is quite
clear that the Court has continued its decades-long trend to further
restrict the congressional plaintiff's access to the federal courts. In all
likelihood, the courthouse door has finally slammed shut.
ADAM L. BLANK

161. Id. at 2320 n.9.

